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This is the third 1 of somewhat laborious examinations of the cases
which the Supreme Court declined to review during a term by exercising its discretionary power to deny petitions for the writ of cer2
tiorari or by dismissing appeals, a procedure but slightly less summary.
A survey of the hundreds of cases which the Court disposed of in this
way indicates three major problems: 1) What are the criteria used by
the Court in granting or denying certiorari? 2) Why does the Court
refuse to give its reasons for a denial and is it justified in such refusal?
3) What is the meaning, theoretically and functionally, of a denial of
certiorari ?
As to the criteria, the bare outline of the certiorari process is to
be found in the Rules of the Supreme Court, especially Rule 38.1 But
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1. The two previous articles were: Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme
Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293 (1950); Harper
and Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1950 Term, 100
U. OF PA. L. Rrv. 354 (1951).

2. See Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. OF CHL L.
REv. 165, 231 (1952), and infra p.
3. Rule 38, paragraph 5, provides:
"A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
"(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of substance not
theretofore determined by this court, or has decided it in a way probably not
in accord with applicable decisions of this court.
(439)
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this Rule is not very helpful; in fact it is practically useless to the lawyer
trying to evaluate his chances of getting his case before the Court or
trying to understand why he failed in the attempt. The Court has succeeded in cloaking its certiorari behavior in such a shroud of mystery
that any explanation of what happens is the sheerest guesswork.
Justice Frankfurter is the most vocal member of the Court in connection with its discretionary jurisdiction, but what he says from time
to time is not very helpful. In 1950 he purported to throw some light
on the subject. His comments did little more than suggest that the
Court sometimes has denied certiorari because the record was "cloudy"
or because the time was not "ripe" for decision.' He apparently believes
that it is impractical or unnecessary to inform the bar of the nation as
to what makes the certiorari machinery tick.
On the other hand, Professor Frankfurter took a different view
of the matter. Some eighteen years ago when the problem was far less
acute, at least quantitatively, than it is now, he stated that an occasional
clarification was highly desirable:
"Accumulated explanations would make familiar the canons
which guide the Court; and an essential aspect of its processes
would be driven in, as it should be driven in, upon the conIn a process so extraordinary, entailciousness of the bar. . .
ing so wide a range of power, the Court itself must be especially
anxious to appear, as well as actually to be, guided in the exercise
of its discretion by standards intelligible to the profession as consistent solely with its responsibilities as the Supreme Court of the
Nation." '
About the only "familiar canon" which has been "driven in,
consciousness of the bar" is that when certiorari is denied,
four of the justices voted to grant the writ. As a "standard",
doubt "intelligible" so far as it goes, but it does not go very

upon the
less than
this is no
far.

"(b) Where a circuit court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another circuit court of appeals on the same matter; or
has decided an important question of federal law which has not been but should
be decided by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way pr6bably
in conflict with applicable decisions of this court; or has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power
of supervision.
"(c) Where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
has decided a question of general importance, or a question of substance relating
to the construction or application of the Constitution, or a treaty or statute,
of the United States, which has not been but should be, settled by this court;
or where that court has not given proper effect to an applicable decision of this
court." U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 38, 5, 28 U.S.C. pp. 3190-1 (1946).
4. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
5. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1933, 48 HARv. L. Rav. 238, 276 (1934).
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During the past term, Justice Frankfurter made three attempts 6
at clarification, pointing out that each of the three cases was an example
of the "kind of question that did not commend itself to at least four
Justices as appropriate for review by this Court." 7 He then proceeded
to describe the issues presented by the three cases. But in none did he
give any suggestion as to why less than four justices--or for that matter
even one of them-thought the case was unworthy of the Court's consideration.
This sort of thing is worthless. Any member of the bar can find
hundreds of cases each term with issues which do not commend themselves to as many as four justices for review. So too, any member of
the bar can discover the issues in such cases by the simple device of
reading the decisions below. These occasional memoranda by Justice
Frankfurter completely miss the mark set forth by Professor Frankfurter in 1934. They are little more than a rehash of the issues already
available and adequately presented elsewhere to the bar.
Why does the Court persist in this hide-and-go-seek game of certiorari? In the 1949 term, Justice Frankfurter said that lack of time
makes it impractical to give reasons for denying certiorari:
"[I]t has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude.
During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms
the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105, 1,189 petitions calling
for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would
not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take
these cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive, apart
from the fact . . . that different reasons not infrequently move

different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case
at a particular time makes review undesirable." 8
During the past term, he twice reasserted and elaborated these views
in explaining why he does not record his dissent to denials of certiorari
when he thinks the writ should be granted:
"On more than one occasion I have indicated the inherent
bars to stating, however briefly, the reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari. See, e.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338
U.S. 912, 917-918. The practical administration of justice, not
any interest of secrecy, precludes. Since the denials of petitions
for certiorari cannot be accompanied with explanations, a public
6. Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 342 U.S. 921 (1952); Leviton v. United States,
343 U.S. 946 (1952); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U.S. 982 (1952).
7. Leviton v. United States, sup-ra note 6.
8. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
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recording of a dissent from such a denial cannot, without more,
fairly disclose to what such dissent is directed. The ambiguous
and unrevealing information afforded by noting such dissent is
rendered still more dubious if dissent is not noted systematically,
but only in selected cases. For these and reinforcing reasons it
has been my unbroken practice not to note when I have dissented
from the denial of petitions by the Court." 9
And again:
"Reference to the opinion in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U.S. 912, makes it unnecessary to indicate the reasons
which preclude the Court from stating, however briefly, the
grounds for denial of petitions for certiorari. Selective notations
of dissent from such denials would not correctly reflect the operation of the certiorari process. That would require notation not
only of all dissents when petitions are denied. It would equally
require public recording of dissents from the granting of petitions.
Due regard for all these factors touching the administration of our
certiorari jurisdiction has determined my unbroken practice not to
note dissent from the Court's disposition of petition for certiorari."

10

But sometimes the Court does give reasons. It happened four
times during the past term. In two cases " it was "for the reasons that
application . . . was not made within the time provided by law.

28

U.S.C. § 2101(c)." In another ' it was "for want of final judgment."
In still a fourth,'" it was "that the judgment of the court below is based
upon a nonfederal ground adequate to support it." To be sure, these
are technical reasons, easily stated. But it does not take any longer to
state that certiorari is denied because, in the judgment of six or more
of the justices, the case is not one of importance in the administration
of justice. Then the bar and the public can pass judgment on the wisdom of the Court's exercise of its discretion. It is not easy to make a
case for the Court's immunity to such judgment.
Of course, no lawyer would suggest that the Court should give
elaborate reasons, or for that matter any reasons at all, for denying
certiorari in a thousand more or less odd cases each term. But there
were 25 cases the past term, 31 the previous term and 64 in the 1949
term in which at least more than two lawyers would have liked reasons
9. Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 342 U.S. 921 (1952).
10. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U.S.
982 (1952).
11. Delphi Frosted Foods Corp. v. Illinois Central R.R., 342 U.S. 833 (1951)
and Hope Basket Co. v. Product Advancement Corp., 342 U.S. 833 (1951).
12. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 342 U.S. 877 (1951).
13. Rice v. Arnold, 342 U.S. 946 (1952).
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for denial. It may very well be that the reasons were adequate in every
case, but it would have been enlightening to the bar to have known
them.
But, assuming that it is impractical to give reasons in 25 or 31 or
64 cases during a term, what of Professor Frankfurter's suggestion of
a fairly complete explanation occasionally so that the "accumulated
explanations would make familiar the canons which guide the Court.
. . ."? Such an explanation would take little, if any, more time, and

would be far more enlightening than repeated memoranda setting forth
the issues in a case with an explanation why dissents are not recorded.
As a matter of fact, an educational process of the kind suggested might
well result in such a better understanding of the operation of the Court's
discretionary jurisdiction as to reduce materially the number of applications for certiorari, thus decreasing the work load of the Court.
As it is now, no one knows why petitions are denied and, working in
the dark, a lawyer sees nothing to lose by taking an outside chance.
A possible practice might be a classification of denials in functional
groups, with an occasional opinion explaining each group.
Now, the old question, what is the meaning of a denial? To quote
Justice Frankfurter again:
"Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a petition for a
writ of certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the
Court thought it should be granted, this Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial carries with it no implication whatever
regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has
declined to review. The Court has said this again and again;
again and again the admonition has to be repeated.
"The one thing that can be said with certainty about the
Court's denial of [the petition in this case] is that it does not
remotely imply approval or disapproval of what was said by [the
lower court]." 14

Once in the 1950 term "I and twice during the past term 6 these
views were reasserted. Justice Frankfurter's most recent effort to explain the lack of significance of a denial of certiorari was his memorandum of November 17, 1952, on the denial of a rehearing on the
petition in the Rosenberg case ,~a to which Justice Black noted his dissent. Again Justice Frankfurter sought to clear up the "misconception"
14. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
15. Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950).
16. Koebler v. United States, 342 U.S. 852, 854 (1951) ; Remington v. United

States, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).

16a. Rosenberg v. United States, 21 U.S.L. WEax 3138 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1952).
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concerning a denial of the writ. "It means," he said, "and all that it
means is, that there were not four members of the Court to whom the
grounds on which the decision of the Court of Appeals was challenged
seemed sufficiently important when judged by the standards governing the issue of the discretionary writ of certiorari." Reduced to simple
language, the result of Justice Frankfurter's position seems to be as
follows: For the first time in American history, two persons have been
condemned to death for espionage in what is legally regarded as "peace"
time-an offense comparable to that for which Klaus Fuchs got fifteen
years. Even though all nine members of the Supreme Court may
regard this conviction and sentence as contrary to law, it may be that
this case was not reviewed on the merits for reasons which it is not
"practical" to reveal to the bar and the public.
Perhaps denials do not imply the way the Court feels about the
decision or the opinion below. But, the opinion below stands as law.
And whether the justices like it or not, lawyers and judges do attach
significance to such denials. During the past year a man was executed
because the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas regarded a denial of
certiorari as approval by the Supreme Court of a local practice of doubtful constitutionality. In Galveston County, Texas, Negroes are effectively barred from sitting on juries in capital trials of other Negroes by
the action of the local prosecutor in preemptorily challenging the Negro
members of the jury panel. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, one Ross, convicted of murder, challenged the constitutionality of
this practice. In answer, the Texas court said:
"The identical question was decided adversely to the appellant in McMurrin v. State, Tex. Cr. App., 239 S.W. 632. This
was also a case from Galveston county. .

.

. The Supreme Court

of the United States refused a writ of certiorari. 342 U.S. 874,
72 S. Ct. 115, 96 L. Ed. --.

In our view their holding is con-

clusive against the contention in the instant case." 17
After this decision, Ross petitioned for Supreme Court review of
the constitutionality of this technique for excluding Negroes from
juries. In the face of the statement by the Texas court that the Supreme
Court had held this practice to be constitutional, the petition was denied,
17. Ross v. State, 246 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. 1952), cert. denied; application
for stay of execution also denied, 343 U.S. 969 (1952). Justice Douglas dissenting.
(Italics added). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed a similar
view in MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 161 n.3 (9th Cir. 1951): "We
recognize that admonishment has followed admonishment, that refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari is not a holding as to any point presented in the
petition for certiorari. But where two important theories clash we, as an intermediate court, can take some comfort at least from the fact that the denial is not
inconsistent with our views."

1953]

WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO IN 1951

445

Justice Douglas alone recording his dissent as he had also done in the
McMurrin case.'"
It is bad when the public views a denial of certiorari as a decision
on the merits; it is worse when the bar does the same. But when the
judiciary also takes the same view, an observer is entitled to question
where the trouble lies and whether the Court is properly discharging
its obligations by an occasional admonition from one justice that such
denials mean only that a bare minority of the Court did not want to
review the case. The real meaning of a denial of certiorari is not what
the justices say it is. It is to be found in the reactions of the public,
the bar and especially the judiciary. Law is not what is said in memoranda essays; it is the behavior of judges, lawyers, and of prosecuting
attorneys in Galveston County, Texas.
The following tables are presented for whatever they may be worth
on this problem:
Decisions of the Court after Granting Certiorari
3 year
3 year
total percentage

1949

1950

1951

Cases from Federal Courts:
Affirmed
Reversed
Total

32
52
84

28
61
89

45
55
100

105
168
273

38%
62%

Cases from State Courts:
Affirmed
Reversed
Total

10
7
17

3
17
20

5
15
20

18
39
57

32%
68%

42
59
101

31
78
109

50
70
120

123
207
330

37%
63%

Cases from both Federal and
State Courts:
Affirmed
Reversed
Total

These figures present the other side of the certiorari process, i.e., how
the Court disposes of the cases in which it grants review. In theory,
the Court grants certiorari in those cases which present issues of general importance." Neither the merits of a case nor the actual decision
18. McMurrin v. Texas, 239 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.), cert. denied, 342
(1951), Justice Douglas dissenting.
19. See Hughes, Address before the American Law Institute, 20
341 (1934); Justice Frankfurter's comments in United States v. Shannon,
288, 294 (1952); Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Workers, Inc.,
387, 393 (1923).

U.S. 874
A.B.A.J.
342 U.S.
261 U.S.
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in the court below is in itself supposed to affect the Court's decision to
grant or deny certiorari except, perhaps, when the decision below is in
conflict with past decisions of the Supreme Court. Yet, during the last
three years the Court reversed the decision below in 207 of its certiorari
cases, while it affirmed in only 123 cases--69% more reversals than
affirmances. As to certiorari cases coming up from the state courts,
there was an even greater difference, the Court having reversed 39
cases and affirmed only 18-more than twice as many reversals as
affirmances.
In view of these facts, one wonders about Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
repeated admonitions that denials of certiorari carry no indication of the
Court's opinion on the merits of the cases. In any particular case that
may be true. But if the cases are viewed as a whole, it would seem that,
since the grants of certiorari came most often in cases where the Court
disapproved of the decisions below, the denial of certiorari may imply
at least some degree of approval of the decision below.
FOOTNOTE ON APPEALS DIsMISSED

Recently, my colleague, John Frank, called attention to the trend
in the Court's practice of handling appeals in a manner which is almost
indistinguishable from petitions for certiorari."0 An appeal is, to be
sure, a matter of right.2 ' But the Court may dismiss an appeal if it is
"insubstantial." 22 The Court, of course, has the last word as to what
is "insubstantial" and sometimes the justices are in disagreement on
the last word. In Frank's words:
"If the Court treats truly arguable questions as 'insubstantial,' or
if it summarily affirms appeals, it has for all practical purposes
obliterated the very difference between certioraris and appeals
which Congress meant to preserve. The Court has for some years
been in the process of interpreting away the difference between appeals and certioraris, reducing the appeals also to a matter of its
own discretion; and it seems probable that within a few years there
will be little practical difference between the two methods of
review." '
In the second of this series of review of certiorari denials, 24 it was
pointed out that in the 1950 term there had been 74 appeals filed. The
20. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. OF CHI. L. Rav.,
165, 231 (1952).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. 1950).
22. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
23. Frank, supra note 20.
24. Harper and Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During
the 1950 Term, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 354 (1951).
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Court noted probable jurisdiction or postponed to a hearing on the
merits 28 of them. In 32 cases the appeal was dismissed; in another
it was dismissed in part, affirmed in part. In 11, the Court affirmed
or reversed without hearing on the merits. Forty-four appeal cases
were disposed of without argument on the merits. This year, of 104
appeals filed, 41 were dismissed, and probable jurisdiction was noted
in 35. In all, it appears that 62 cases were disposed of without argument on the merits.
It is this manner of handling appeals which many members of the
bar do not understand. Here is an example. Riss & Co. v. United
States and InterstateCommerce Commission2 5 involved an appeal from
a per curiam judgment of a three-judge district court, in which appellant demanded opportunity to have a hearing on the merits in an action
to enjoin certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Without written or oral argument on the merits, the Court, in a per
curiam order, affirmed the judgment below. Justices Black, Reed, and
Douglas dissented, not on the merits, but from the Court's action in
deciding the case without oral argument.
In 1913, the Urgent Deficiencies Act 28 required a three-judge
district court to hear bills to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Act provided further that "appeals may be taken in like
manner as appeals are taken under existing law in equity cases." Title
28 of the United States Code 27 provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal
to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after
notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in
any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges." 28
Here is the argument, as presented to the Court in Appellants'
Petition for Rehearing of Per Curiam Order Affirming Judgment
Below. It speaks for itself: 29
"The manner of appeal to which Appellant is entitled, therefore, must be determined by reference to 'existing law in equity
cases' in 1913.
"The Rules of this Court provided in 1913 that appeal cases
would not be heard until a complete record and plenary briefs were
25. 342 U.S. 937 (1952).
26. 28 U.S.C. §§ 43-48 (1946).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1949).
28. The Reviser's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 state that § 1253 consolidates § 47(a)
with other sections of the 1940 Code and cite the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913
as a source.
29. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 5, 8-9.
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received covering the merits of the factual and legal controversy.
222 U.S., App'x 12-15 (1911); 226 U.S. 671 (1912). In the
1910, 1911, 1912, and 1913 terms, cases on appeal were decided
only after receipt of briefs and opportunity for oral arguments on
law and facts.
"The Rules of this Court and its treatment of appeals in
equity cases, therefore, shows that the 'manner of appeal' provided
by Congress in the Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913 included the
right to submit plenary argument on the merits.
"In the interests of affording the Court a manageable docket
and in allowing the Court to give greater attention to cases deemed
of most importance, Congress has divided the appellate jurisdiction of this Court into two categories. Certiorari was chosen as a
means of permitting this Court discretion in selecting cases for
review from most of the type of cases decided by inferior courts.
Appeal, on the other hand, included only cases where review was
not discretionary. Congressional definition of these categories
produced the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936, in which Congress provided for an extremely limited class of cases where appeal
to this Court was of right. Frankfurter & Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court 280 (1928).
"Within the category of cases coming to this Court on appeal
Congress carefully has established jurisdictional requirements.
The sole jurisdictional requirement established for an appeal of
the type here involved is whether the case is within the jurisdiction of the statutory three-judge District Court. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1253, 2325. In this case the jurisdiction of the three-judge
District Court has never been questioned.
"Congress provided in the Urgent Deficiencies Act for a
direct appeal to this Court from a statutory three-judge District
Court. The reason being, as stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, at 233 (1938):
'In the opinion of Congress jurisdiction with the extraordinary features of the Urgent Deficiencies Act was justified
by the character of the cases to which it applied--cases of
public importance because of the widespread effect of the decisions thereof.'
"Despite the mandate of the Urgent Deficiencies Act, and
despite the fact that no one ever has doubted the jurisdiction of the
three-judge District Court, this Court has, nevertheless, affirmed
this appeal without affording Appellant an opportunity to present
full argument on the merits. As a practical matter, the affirmance
of the judgment in this case is little different from denial of a
petition for a writ of certiorari, though the operative papers bear
different names."
It is not surprising that responsible members of the bar question the
responsibility of the Court which can so cavalierly deny an appeal with-
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out an opportunity to present the merits of a case which, if any, is
within its obligatory jurisdiction.
THE WORK OF THE TERM

Table I
Disposition of Cases by Dockets
1. Appellate Docket
Total cases
Cases disposed of:
By written opinions
By per curiam orders or opinions
By motion to dismiss or per stipulation
By denial or dismissal of petitions for certiorari
Total disposed of
Remaining on docket
2. Miscellaneous Docket
Total cases
Cases disposed of:
By transfer to appellate docket
By per curiam order or opinion
By denial or dismissal of certiorari
By denial or withdrawal of other applications
Total disposed of
Remaining on docket

1950

1951

783

827

539

532

1335
1216
119

1368
1222
146

3. Original Docket
Total cases
Cases disposed of
Remaining on docket
4. All Dockets
Total cases
Cases disposed of
Remaining on dockets

The statistics presented in Table I reveal the bare outlines of the
work of the Supreme Court 'during the 1951 term. For purposes of
comparison, corresponding figures for the 1950 term are also given,.
Standing alone, these figures do little more than indicate the great
volume of business disposed of by the Court. Further breakdown of
the figures reveals the manner of disposition of this work.
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Table II
Per Curiam Orders or Opinions
1949
92

1. Total orders or opinions
2. Merits actually argued:
Certiorari cases:
Affirmed after argument
5
Reversed after argument
4
0
Certiorari granted, continued to next term
Motion for reconsideration continued
0
Appeal cases:
5
Affirmed after argument
Reversed after argument
3
Dismissed after argument
0
Dismissed but certiorari later granted
0
Total-merits argued
17
3. Disposed of without argument:
Certiorari cases:
Reversed, remanded, or dismissed on motion 13
Appeal cases:
Dismissed
38
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part
0
Affirmed
23
Reversed
1
Total-merits not argued
75

1950
77

1951
99

5
2
2
1

7
7
2
0

0
1
0
1
12

4
3
2
0
25

21

12

32
1
9
2
65

41
0
15
6
74

Table III
Disposition With and Without Argument on Merits
1. Cases disposed of after argument on the merits:
Original Docket
Signed opinions
Per Curiam opinions or orders
Total
2. Cases disposed of without hearing argument on
the merits:
Denied certiorari, Appellate Docket
Digmissed on motion or per stipulation,
Appellate Docket
Denied certiorari, Miscellaneous Docket

1950

1951

5
114
12
131

0
98
25
123

495

518

4
386

4
386
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Denied or withdrew other applications,
Miscellaneous Docket
Disposed of by per curiam orders or opinions
Total
3. Total cases disposed of
4. Of all cases disposed of, the percentage in which
the merits were actually argued

451

121
65
1071
1202

102
74
1084
1222

10.9%

10.2%

Per curiam orders and opinions of the Court are much misunderstood. Many lawyers regard such an order as a decision going to the
heart of the controversy. Per curiam orders are considered a "disposition on the merits" by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, who includes them as such in his Official Statistics, but, this inclusion is misleading. Of the 99 per curiam orders and opinions issued by the Court
this term, only 25 came after argument on the merits; 33 vacated,
reversed, or affirmed the judgment below without hearing arguments;
41 dismissed appeals, all but 4 "for the want of a substantial federal
question."
Even if the 33 decisions entered without argument be regarded as
grants of review,"' the 37 orders which dismissed appeals "for want
of a substantial federal question" cannot be so regarded. These appeals
are dismissed on the basis of the jurisdictional statements alone. Although some jurisdictional statements are in the nature of briefs, many
are not. In the latter cases counsel presumably follow the rules of the
Court and present a statement of grounds for jurisdiction, expecting to
file a full brief on the merits after probable jurisdiction has been either
"noted" or "postponed." However, the great majority never get the
opportunity to file briefs.
Table IV
Analysis of the rulings of the Court during the 1951 term
.granting and denying review 32
1. Cases granting review:
Appellate Docket:
Appeals:
Probable jurisdiction noted and jurisdiction
postponed

35

30. The difference between these figures and the "total disposed of" in Table I
is accounted for by the double inclusion in the Official Statistics (Table I) of the
Miscellaneous Docket cases transferred to the Appellate Docket upon the granting
of certiorari.
31. In four cases Justices noted nine dissents to the action of the Court in rendering decisions per curiam without hearing oral argument. Justice Black so dissented
three times; Justices Reed and Douglas twice each; Justices Jackson and Burton
once each.

For an example of such a case, see text at note 25 Vpra.

32. When a case is taken to the Supreme Court in the hope of obtaining review,
generally three possible fates await it. (a) It may be denied review outright
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Per curiam affirmed
Per curiam reversed
Total appeals granted review
Certioraris:
Per curiam orders
Certiorari granted
Total certioraris granted review
Total cases granted review
2. Cases denying review:
Appellate Docket:
Appeals:
Dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction
Total appeals dismissed
Certiorari denied
Miscellaneous Docket:
Certiorari denied
Total cases denied review
3. Total applications for review (not withdrawn)
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15
6
56
8
78
86
165

37
4
41
518
386
945
1110

These figures serve as background to explain the more significant
results indicated in the following tables, which present a comprehensive,
three-year picture of grants and denials of review.
Table V-A
Comparative Statistics
All cases on the Appellate Docket
Disposed of on the merits "
Disposed of by denial of certiorari
Remaining on docket at term end
Percentage cases disposed on merits
Percentage cases denied certiorari
Percentage work left undone

1949
867
201
556
110
23%
64%
13%

1950
783
192
495
96
25%
64%
11%0

1951
827
196
518
113
24%
62%
14%

(certiorari denied or appeal dismissed). (b) It may be given a "limited review"-i.e., the Court may per curiam vacate, reverse or affirm the judgment without ever
hearing argument on the merits. (c) It may be given "full review"-i.e., oral argument plus an opinion or order. Occasionally, a case is "dismissed" after oral argument because on the closer examination permitted by oral argument the Court becomes convinced that it does not present issues of sufficient importance to warrant
a decision.
33. This is the official figure, and it includes, as pointed out in connection with
Table III, supira, the per curiam dismissals of appeals, which the present writers
maintain are not decisions on the merits, but rather are denials of review.
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All cases on the Miscellaneous Docket
568
Disposed of on the merits
7
Disposed of by denial of certiorari
436
Disposed of by denial or withdrawal of
other applications
108
Remaining on docket at term end
17
Percentage cases disposed on merits
1.2%
Percentage cases denied certiorari
77%
Percentage cases disposed by denial or
withdrawal of other applications
18.9%
Percentage work left undone
2.9%

539
17
386

532
20
386

121
15
3.1%
72%

102
24
3.9%
72.6%

22%
2.9%

19%
4.5%

Table V-B
Comparative Statistics on Denials of Review
1949
1179
Total rulings on review
Denials of review:
556
Certiorari denied, Appellate Docket
Certiorari denied, Miscellaneous Docket
436
Appeals dismissed
41
1033
Total denials of review
Of total rulings, percentage denials
87.6%

1950
1057

1951
1110

495
386
33
914
86.5%

518
386
41
945
85.6%

Of 1110 applications for review acted upon by the Supreme Court
during the recent term (this figure does not include the miscellaneous
docket applications for mandamus, habeas corpus and other forms of
relief), the Court denied review in 945 cases or 85.6% and granted
review in only 165 cases or 14.4%. In the 1950 term 86.5% of the
applications for review were denied, while in the 1949 term 87.6% of
such requests were denied.
If the "other applications for relief" on the Miscellaneous Docket
which were refused by the Court without explanation are added to the
above figures, the percentage of cases in which review or relief were
denied increases to 86.4% in 1951, 87.8% in 1950, and 89% in 1949.

Total rulings on review

1949
1179

1950
1057

1951
1110

3 year
total
3346

Rulings on applications for other
relief (Miscellaneous Docket)
Total rulings on review or relief

108
1287

121
1178

102
1212

331
3677
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Total denials of review
Refusals of other relief (Miscellaneous Docket)
Total denials of review or relief
Percentage of total rulings that
are denials of review or relief
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1033

914

945

2892

108
1141

121
1035

102
1047

331
3223

89%

87.8%

86.4%

87.7%o

From the above figures it can be seen that over the last three years
the Supreme Court has in silence disposed of 87.7o of the cases
presented to it.
DIsSENTs NOTED

Occasionally one or more Justices will note his dissent to the
Court's action in denying certiorari or in dismissing an appeal. Since
the Justices seldom give their reasons for dissenting and since they
presumably do not note their dissents systematically, these indications
of disagreement are of little help to the student of the certiorari process.
In the 1951 term only Justice Minton did not go on record at least
once in connection with a denial of review. Justice Frankfurter did not
dissent from denials of review in the usual form. During the past term
he twice repeated his policy not to record his disagreement with the
Court's action in denials of review. 4 Yet in those same cases and in
a few others3 5 he commented on one or more aspects of the certiorari
process. Why he selected these particular cases for his remarks is a
mystery, unless they were indirect indications of strongly felt disagreement.
Dissents were noted during the term in a total of 41 cases. Justice
Black, as usual, was the most frequent dissenter with 35 cases, followed by Douglas with 20 cases. These two joined their dissents in
15 cases. Compared to them, the rest of the Court presents an insignificant number of dissents for the record-Reed and Burton three
each, Jackson two, and Vinson and Clark one each. Black and Douglas
were the only Justices who dissented alone, the others having recorded
their dissents in various combinations. The following table gives a
numerical analysis of the dissents both for this term and for the preceding two terms.
34. Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 342 U.S. 921 (1952)

and Chemical Bank &

Trust Co. v. Group of Institutional Investors, 343 U.S. 982 (1952).
35. Leviton v. United States, 343 U.S. 946 (1952); Koehler v. United States,
342 U.S. 852, 854 (1951); Remington v. United States, 343 U.S. 907 (1952).
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Dissent Statistics
A. By Individual Justices
1950
1949
33
34
Total cases
22
30
Black
21
15
Douglas
4
3
Reed
1
1
Burton
0
1
Jackson
0
0
Vinson
0
0
Clark
0
0
Minton
0
0
Frankfurter
48
50
Total justices dissenting

1951
41
35
20
3
3
2
1
1
0
0
65

3 year total
108
87
56
10
5
3
1
1
0
0
163

B. Combinations of Justices by Cases
Black alone
Douglas alone
Reed alone
Burton alone
Black and Douglas
Black, Douglas and Reed
Black, Douglas and Burton
Black and Burton
Black and Jackson
Black and Reed
Douglas and Reed
Jackson, Burton and Vinson
Jackson, Reed and Clark
Total cases in which dissents
were noted

1951
18
3
0
0
14
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1

3 year total
42
13
3
2
37
4
1
1
1

0
0
0

1950
9
8
2
1
11
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

34

33

41

108

1949
15
2
1
1
12
1
0
0
1
1

1
1
1
1

Of the 945 cases which the Court declined to review during the past
term, the authors have selected 25 cases which, in their judgment,
presented questions of sufficient importance to merit review. This number compares with 37 cases so selected from the previous term and 64
from the 1949 term. Thus, during the three terms covered by these
studies, the Court, in carrying out its duties as supervisor of law and
justice in this nation, has sidestepped 126 cases which, on their face,
appeared worthy of its attention. In most of the 25 cases from the 1951
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term, one or more members of the Court agreed with the authors that
the case was entitled to review. As usual, the largest single group of
these cases involved some phase of civil or political rights.
SUPERVISION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

(a) Discrimination Cases. Discussing possible reasons which
led the Court or more than five of the justices to vote against granting certiorari, the authors of the first of this series " quoted Justice
Frankfurter 3 as follows: "Pertinent considerations of judicial policy
here come into play.

.

. . Wise adjudication has its own time for

ripening." The authors then observed: 38 "During the past term, the
Court reviewed several segregation cases of great importance.8 9 It will
be interesting to observe the grants and denials in other segregation
cases during the next few terms."
Interesting it has been, indeed. In the 1949 term, the Court
avoided facing the segregation problem in connection with the use of
tennis courts in a public park.40 At the following term, it avoided the
issue raised by Glen Taylor when he was forceably prevented by the
police from entering a church through a Negro entrance." In both
cases, the State courts were allowed to circumvent the real issue by
finding a "nonfederal" ground for the decision.
During the last term, the Court veered away from two more cases
involving this problem. In Rice v. Arnold, a writ of mandamus was
sought to compel an administrative official to permit a Negro to play
golf on a municipal course on the same basis as white persons. Under
prevailing rules, the course was allocated to Negroes one day each week
and to whites six days. Negroes, of course, could not play on "white"
days and vice versa, even though the course was empty. The allocation was based on the proportional number of Negro and white golfers
wanting to use the course. The writ was denied and the Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed.' In a per curiam opinion, at the 1950 term,
the Supreme Court of the United States ordered the judgment vacated
and reconsidered in the light of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases.43 The
36. Harper and Rosenthal, supra, note 1, at 299.
37. From his opinion on the occasion of the denial of a writ of certiorari in
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
38. Harper and Rosenthal, supra, note 1, at 299-300.
39. These were Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (law school) ; McLaurin
v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (graduate school); Henderson v. United States,
339 U.S. 816 (1950) (dining cars).
40. Winkler v. State, 69 A.2d 674 (Md. 1949) cert. denied, 339 U.S. 919 (1949).
41. Taylor v. Birmingham, 253 Ala. 369, 45 So.2d 60, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
832 (1950).
42. Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950).
43. 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
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Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the judgment, finding no unconstitutional discrimination.4" The Supreme Court of the United States
denied certiorari on the ground that it could be supported on a nonfederal ground.45 Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
In its "reconsideration," the Florida court thought the case fell
outside the Sweatt and McLaurin cases because the facilities offered the
Negro golfer were the identical facilities enjoyed by white golfers. It
did not deal adequately, however, with the proposition that in both
cases, the alleged discrimination had to do with the use of the facilities
rather than with the facilities themselves. In addition, the Court did
not discuss the argument that a part of the value of recreation derives
from the pleasure, stimulation and skill developed from friendly competition with players of one's own choosing 4 nor the fact that any
particular white golfer had a choice of six days to play as against a
Negro's one. The Florida court further found that the "circuit court
clearly indicated to relator that he could pursue another remedy.
Relator has not seen fit to do so. Rights under the Federal Constitution
as well as other rights must be enforced by orderly processes of the
courts and in accordance with established rules."
A second case from Florida involved the recurring problem of
It appears that a group of Negroes had
segregation in education.
applied for admission to the University of Florida. One Hawkins
wanted to attend the Law School. On rejection of his application, he
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of Control to admit
him. The Board had set up a paper Law School at the State Negro
College and instructed its administrative officer to get a faculty, library,
and whatever else was necessary to make it an "equal" facility. The
writ was refused with the proviso that the court would retain jurisdiction until it be shown to the court's satisfaction that the Board either
has furnished or has failed to furnish substantially equal facilities to
Negroes as to white law students. Ten months thereafter the Negro
filed another motion renewing his request for mandamus and alleging
the failure of the Board to provide him with equal educational opportunities. The Supreme Court of Florida again denied the motion on the
ground that there was no showing that the relator was entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting, on the ground that there had been no
final judgment.
44. Rice v. Arnold, 54 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1951).
45. 342 U.S. 946 (1952).
46. See 35 MiNe. L. REv. 399, 401 (1951).
47. Florida cx rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 53 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.

458

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101

This Negro instituted his original mandamus proceeding in the
summer of 1949 when he sought admission to the University of Florida.
If he had been admitted and successfully pursued his studies, he would
have been graduated and launched on his professional career by this
time. As it is, he has not even begun his legal education but is still in
48
the state courts where he started.

Of the many possible explanations for the denial of certiorari in
these cases, it may be that less than four justices thought the time "ripe
for decision." Action by the Court at the end of the past term and the
beginning of the present term tends to confirm this guess. On June 9,
1952, probable jurisdiction was noted in two cases,49 one from South
Carolina and one from Kansas, both involving segregation in schools.
On October 13, 1952, the Court noted probable jurisdiction in a similar
case from Virginia; " it granted certiorari in a school segregation case
in the District of Columbia on November 10,"' and in the same type of
case in Delaware on November 24.52 rhese cases, of course, have now
been argued jointly and are awaiting decision.
Just why the time is "ripe" for tackling this problem after the
election when it was not before is a matter for speculation. The arguments in the Kansas and South Carolina cases were originally scheduled
for the week of October 13, three weeks before elections. On the first
day of the 1952 term, the Court by per curiam order noted probable
jurisdiction in the Virginia case. At the same time it took judicial
notice of the case then pending in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, and postponed the argument of the three cases until the
time when, if ever, certiorari was applied for in it. Justice Douglas
dissented from the postponing of argument and decision in the cases
already in the Supreme Court. 2a
In a Texas mandamus proceeding, 53 an attempt was made to compel a school district to provide equal facilities for Negro children within
48. Again on June 2, 1952, Hawkins filed a third motion for a writ of mandamus
without submitting evidence that the Negro Law School was not "equal" in facilities.
This time, the motion was denied and the cause dismissed. State ex el. Hawkins
v. Board of Control, 60 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1952). Petition for certiorari is now pending
in the present term.
49. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951) and Brown v. Board
of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797 '(D. Kan. 1951), probable jurisdictio, in both noted,
20 U.S.L. WEEK 3325 (U.S. June 9, 1952).
50. Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), probable
jurisdiction noted, 21 U.S.L. WEzK 3086 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1952).
51. Bolling v. 'Sharpe, cert. granted in advance of judgment, 21 U.S.L. WEEl
3128 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1952).
52. Gebhart v. Bolton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952).
52a. See 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3095 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1952).

53. Trustees of Pleasant Grove Ind. School Distr. v. Bagsby, 237 S.W.2d 750

(Tex. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 821 (1951).
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the district where no facilities whatever were available to them. The
district had arranged with an adjoining school district for facilities
about which there was no complaint. The children, however, had to
be transported three and one-half miles to get to school. The Texas
court held that this situation was not in conflict with the State's constitutional obligations. Certiorari was denied with no recorded dissent.
What looks like an important question was sidestepped when the
Court denied certiorari in Bates v. Batte 14 in which Negro schoolteachers in Mississippi complained of unconstitutional discrimination in
the fixing of salaries for teachers in the public schools. They sought
the aid of a Federal court to enjoin such discrimination in accordance
with the Civil Rights Act." The district court found that the Negro
teachers were being discriminated against, but denied relief on the
grounds that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
It seems that the requirement that a complainant must have exhausted administrative remedies prior to a resort to a federal court is
a rule that the Supreme Court has applied where Congress had indicated
a design to confer on an administrative agency exclusive primary jurisdiction to determine certain matters and afford a remedy. 6 It is by no
means clear that the same requirement obtains when there is no such
Congressional intent. 57 Obviously the Civil Rights Act does not fit
into this pattern and if there were any doubt, it would be removed by
the judicial Code," which confers jurisdiction on district courts in such
cases without any conditions. The substantive question involved in the
case was whether there had been an unconstitutional discrimination in
teacher's salaries. This is not the type of question peculiarly susceptible
of administrative determination."' It is an important question of policy
whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is properly applicableespecially when it is altogether unlikely that any relief would be forthcoming.
54. 187 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
55. 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. §43 (1946).
56. SEC v. Otis, 338 U.S. 843 (1949); FPC v. Arkansas P. & L. Co., 330
U.S. 802 (1947).
57. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) ; Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
58. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: * * * "(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States
or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (Supp. 1950).

59. See Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remwdies, Ripeiwss for Review, and Primary Jurisdiction, 28 TEx. L. REv. 168, 402 (1949).
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Failure to exhaust administrative remedies was also fatal to petitioners in Peay v. Cox,6 where a number of Negro citizens of Mississippi, several of them college-trained, were deprived of their vote on
the ground that they could not understand the Mississippi Constitution.
State law provided for an appeal from the Register to the County
Election Commissioners and thence to the courts. In this case, however, petitioners, on refusal of the Register to qualify them as voters,
filed their cause in the district court asking for injunctive relief. There
were several thousand Negro residents of Forrest County. If every one
of them had been required to go to the Supreme Court of Mississippi
to get relief, it is obvious that several elections would have gone by
before most of them would have been declared eligible to vote. Moreover, the aggregate expense would be enormous. The undisputed facts
indicated that there were almost as many Negro citizens in Forrest
County as there were white citizens. During the period in question,
thousands of white citizens had been registered whereas less than 50
Negroes were able to "qualify." Cost bonds on appeal to the state
circuit court in individual proceedings were $100; on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Mississippi $500. It looks as though every Negro
in Forrest County who wants to vote must dig up $600 in addition to
attorney's fees.
(b) Freedom of Religion Cases. In Heisler v. Board of Review,
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation,61 an appeal was dismissed as
presenting no substantial federal question. An Ohio statute had been
construed to require an Orthodox Jew either to accept a job which
required her to work on Saturday or to forfeit all rights to unemployment compensation. Although a similar question had been raised in
Ohio by a previous case 6 in which the Supreme Court of Ohio took
the same position, another ground for the decision was specifically
mentioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in dismissing
the appeal in that case.' It appears that here the freedom of religion
issue is presented in this context for the first time. Presumably a
denial to a worker of compensation benefits interferes with the free
64
exercise of religion more seriously than a license tax on preaching.
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable to the states
the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment.6 5 This
60. 190 F.2d 123, (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
61. 156 Ohio St. 395, 102 N.E.2d 601, appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952).
62. Kut v. Albers Super Market, Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643, appeal
dimnissed sub win. Kut v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 329 U.S. 669
(1946).
63. 329 U.S. 669 (1946).
64. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
65. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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clause limits what a state or the Federal government can do in the way
of penalizing the citizen for religious beliefs. "Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another." " It looks as if the Ohio statute, as interpreted, preferred
one religion over another. The Unemployment Compensation Bureau
of Ohio can require a person to work on Saturday or lose his benefits,
but it may not require a person to work on Sunday.
Justice Douglas dissented from the dismissal of the appeal in another of those perennial Jehovah's Witnesses cases.6 7 Two preachers
of this sect were arrested in Allentown, Pa., for operating a sound truck
in the business district of the city which had been zoned by city ordinance to exclude sound trucks altogether. The Witnesses argued that
their freedom of speech and freedom of worship had been abridged contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments:
"In this day of supersonic airplanes, hydrogen bombs and electronic developments, a loud-speaking apparatus has become a common convenience. Sound-amplifying devices used by speakers bear
a necessary relationship to freedom of speech and religion exercised by a preacher acting faithfully and seriously as an obedient
servant of his Master (Isaiah 12:6; Matthew 10:27) which must
not be prohibited or censored." 6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, apparently more impressed with
the relevancy of Kovacs v. Cooper 69 than Isaiah and Matthew, held
otherwise. Nevertheless, there is Saia v. New York,70 and it does not
appear just how "loud and raucous" the "noises" were which this
sound truck emitted. There may have been, on the whole record, a
plausible case for clarification by the Court. The previous opinions by
the various justices do not make the sound truck situation entirely
lucid.
SUPERVISION OF POLITICAL RIGHTS

A curious twist to the discrimination problem was raised in a
Georgia case 71 in which a white voter sued officers of the State Executive Committee of the Democratic party for damages. Plaintiff claimed
that the application of the county unit system in the 1950 primary
66. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
67. Commonwealth v. Guess, 168 Pa. Super. 22, 76 A.2d 500 (1950), cert. denied,

342 U.S. 912 (1952).
68. Brief for Petitioners, p. 16.
69. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
70. 334 U.S. 558 (1948)

(in which an ordinance requiring a permit for the

use of a sound device was held unconstitutional).
71. Cox v. Peters, 208 Ga. 498, 67 S.E.2d 579 (1951), appeal dismnissed, 342
U.S. 936 (1952), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.
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reversed his vote for the losing gubernatorial candidate and that under
that system his "white" vote was given less effect than "Negro" votes
in the state, thus depriving him of the equal protection of the law. The
Georgia supreme court held that the Democratic primary was not an
"election" under the laws of Georgia and that the right to participate
therein was not protected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed "for want of
a substantial Federal question." justices Black and Douglas dissented.
This sort of thing has been going on since 1946.72 It appears that
the Supreme Court just is not going to upset the Georgia unit system.
In their dissent in the Peters case,"3 justices Black and Douglas pointed
out that "there is a heavy Negro population in the large cities" who
were "heavily disenfranchised by the county unit system." Indeed,
voters in Fulton county, largest in the state, contended that a vote in
the smallest rural county was given 120 times as much weight as one of
theirs. The current contention by a white voter is probably correct
in some parts of the state. This system undoubtedly works out inequitably in many respects, perhaps discriminating here against a
Negro voter, there against a white one. But it is a curious logic that
would regard two discriminations as eliminating both. The Georgia
system has been under fire now for several years, and four Supreme
Court Justices have recorded serious doubts as to its constitutionality.
It is true that Justices Murphy and Rutledge are no longer on the Court,
but that does not diminish the importance of the question. But again,
it may be that more than five Justices thought the time "not ripe for
decision."
Again the Supreme Court has declined to rule on that chronic
ailment of the American democratic process, the apportionment of
legislative districts. In Anderson v. Jordan,74 petitioner claimed the
72. In Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1946), an action for a
declaratory judgment challenging the Georgia county unit system as applied to a
congressional primary was dismissed. A similar suit directed at the gubernatorial
primary was also dismissed. Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga.
1946). The Supreme Court dismissed both appeals, 329 U.S. 675 (1946), on the
authority of Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) in which Justices Black and
Douglas dissented, as did Justice Murphy. The per curiam order cited only a case
involving mootness. Justices Black and Douglas thought that probable jurisdiction
should have been noted. Justice Rutledge thought the question of jurisdiction
should have been postponed to a hearing on the merits.
In 1950, much the same thing happened. The District Court again dismissed
the suit, South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950). The Supreme Court
this time affirmed per curiam, saying, "Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise
their equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical
distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions." South v. Peters,
339 U.S. 276 (1946). Justices Black and Douglas again dissented.
73. See note 72 mtpra.
74. Cal. Sup. Ct., no opinion, judgment entered Nov. 15, 1951, appeal dismissed,
343 U.S. 912 (1952), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.
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unequal reapportionment and redistricting of California assembly and
congressional districts violated the equal protection and privileges
and immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil
Rights Act 7' was the basis of plaintiff's suit to compel reapportionment
in Remmey v. Smith," where only the apportionment of the state
assembly districts was called into question.
Both Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the dismissal of
the appeal in the Anderson case; but when it came to the Remmey
case, involving only state assembly districts, Black alone recorded a
dissent. The express reason for the dismissal of the Remmey appeal
was "want of a substantial federal question." Apparently, then, either
Justice Douglas feels that reapportionment among state assembly districts is exclusively a state problem, involving no question of federal
rights, or he did not deem the denial of review significant enough to
warrant the noting of his disagreement.
Much has been written on the reapportionment problem, 7 7 most

of it condemning the state legislatures for their selfish manipulation of
election districts to achieve a party advantage and the Supreme Court
for its consistent refusal to intervene. Nothing would be contributed
here by a rehash of the merits of the problem. It is generally agreed
by the commentators on the subject that the Supreme Court should
compel reasonable equality in state apportionments; but from the
refusals to review these two cases as well as Cox v. Peter 78 it appears
that no solution will be forthcoming in the near future. 79
SUPERVISION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

Maclnnis v. United States,80 like Hallinan v. United States,"' is
an aftermath of the conviction in the Bridges case.' During the trial,
the court announced that the conduct of one of Bridges' attorneys had
been contemptuous and that the certificate and order pursuant to Federal Rule 42 and the fixing of punishment would be deferred to the end
75.17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1950).
76. 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1951), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 916 (1952),
Justice Black dissenting.
77. See EmERSON AND HABER, POLITICAL AND CiviL RiGIHTS IN THE UNITED

STATFS, 336-338 (1952) ; Bowman, Congressional Redistricting and the Constitution,
31 MICH. L. REv. 149 (1932); Note, Constitutional Right to Cogressional Districts of Equal Population, 56 YALE L.J. 127 (1946).
78. Note 71 mipra.
79. See Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.

549, 564 (1946).
80. 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952),
Black and Douglas dissenting.
81. 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951).
82. United States v. Bridges, 87 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. Cal. 1949).

Justices
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of the trial. After the jury's verdict had been returned, the judge sentenced the lawyer to three months imprisonment, without notice or hearing or an opportunity to defend against the contempt charge.
Of course, the judge's behavior was well within the decision of the
Second Circuit in United States v. Sacher,"3 which by a two to one
vote 4 affirmed Judge Medina's contempt finding at the end of the
lengthy trial of the eleven top Communist leaders. The issues in all
these cases are difficult, technical and of the greatest national significance, involving as they do the extent to which a trial judge may
protect the dignity of the court by summary punishment, the individual's
right to counsel, and the problems faced by counsel as an advocate for
his client's cause. These issues have been elaborately explored elsewhere. 5 Justices Black and Douglas noted their dissents here, as in
previous cases involving the same or kindred problems."6
In Koehler v. United States,8 7 a county police officer committed
an outrageous assault on a motorist who had accidentally run over the
officer's dog. The officer was prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act. 8
The evidence clearly showed that he acted "under color of law." He
used his police siren while pursuing his victim; he placed the motorist
"under arrest," demanding of the latter, "Didn't you know that I am
the law ?" He then lodged the hapless fellow in jail. The trial court
instructed the jury that "the intent is presumed and inferred from the
result of the action" and that "the color of the act determines the complexion of the intent."
As Justice Jackson pointed out in his dissent to the denial of certiorari, the section of the Civil Rights Act involved is full of vagueness,
as "attested by the fact that this Court cannot decide most issues of
83. 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 851, 952 (1951), cert.
granted, 342 U.S. 858, aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
84. Judge Clark dissented from the decision by Judges A. Hand and Frank.
85. Harper and Haber, Lawyer Troubles in Political Trials, 60 YALB L.J. 1
86. In two other cases of contempt, Hammett v. United States, 342 U.S. 894
(1951); Field v. United States, 342 U.S. 894 (1951), the Court denied certiorari
over dissents by Justices Black and Douglas. These cases involved the Communist
bail episodes. Sureties on forfeited bonds refused to answer questions concerning
their acquaintance and last contact with missing Smith Act violators who failed to
appear for sentence. Notwithstanding a plea of self-incrimination, they were held in
contempt, as was a witness who admitted he was a trustee of the Communist bail fund
but refused to produce his books and records, and refused to testify as to their contents or to matters "auxiliary" to the production of such records.
87. 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 852 (1951), Justices Black
and Jackson dissenting, Justice Frankfurter commenting.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Supp. 1952): "Whoever, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason
of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be
fined. ...."
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deprivation of constitutional right without dissent, and often divides
five to four." There is great difficulty, therefore, in the determination
of whether a given act was done "willfully" to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights. The Court in the Screws case 89 held that there
must be some sort of specific intent to deprive the victim of his constitutional rights and that the mere intention to do the act which resulted in such deprivation is not enough.
Now, whatever this mystic "specific intent" might be, it is hard
to find any recognition of it in the trial court's charge in the Koehler
case. To quote again from Justice Jackson's dissent:
"Under the trial court's construction, the Government may merely
prove the act and rest-the presumption does the work of evidence.
Under the Screws case, no such presumption was authorizedthe Government would have to produce evidence, circumstantial
in most cases, to be sure, from which the jury could reasonably
infer the specific intent."
This problem is clearly important in the administration of the criminal law, in the light of the heavy burden of proof which the Government is required to satisfy in criminal cases. It is to be noted that
Justice Jackson is going much further than merely noting a dissent to
the denial of certiorari, as did Justice Black. In substance, he is pronouncing the lower court in error, at least insofar as the Screws case
is law." What Justice Frankfurter meant by his short paragraph is
difficult to surmise.91
William Remington, like Alger Hiss, Whitaker Chambers and
Elizabeth Bentley, has been a headline name for several years. His conviction of perjury was reversed and remanded, and certiorari denied by
the Supreme Court."2 Remington wanted the indictment quashed,
among other reasons, because of improprieties in the grand jury investigation by the foreman, one Brunini, who allegedly had a financial
interest in Bentley's book. Elizabeth Bentley, of course, was the government's chief witness against Remington. The court of appeals
stated that it would not deal with this charge, presumably since the court
was reversing for a new trial. But if the indictment were quashed,
there would be no new trial. The charge that a man had been indicted
89. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
90. Referring to the trial court's charge, the Justice said: "This is wrong even
by the test in the Screws decision" (to which he had dissented). 342 U.S. 852,

853 (1951).

91. "In not joining this dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wishes to refer to his
views as to the meaning of a denial of certiorari. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912." (342 U.S. 852, 854 (1951). What is this merry-goround? Did the Justice dissent or didn't he?
92. Remington v. United States, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 907 (1952), Justices Black and Douglas dissenting.
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to further a juror's financial gain is not trivial. Justices Black and
Douglas, departing from custom, noted their dissent to the denial of
certiorari in a memorandum opinion.
To be sure, the Government had indicted Remington a second
time on the ground that he lied in his perjury trial when he swore he
had never been a Communist (a technique, which presumably could go
on forever, to get around double jeopardy). But it is not at all clear
that both prosecutions might not be possible, although perhaps not
simultaneously. If so, it is also not clear that the Government might
not initiate two prosecutions, as the Bridges' litigation suggests.
Richards v. United States9 4 raises the question whether, to attack
the credibility of a defendant charged with a felony, the prosecution
may cross-examine him on conviction of a previous crime for which he
had been pardoned. Defendant was so cross-examined, convicted and
the conviction affirmed by a divided court of appeals.
The question has never been decided by the Supreme Court although there have been cases involving the legal effect of a pardon in
other contexts,9 5 and there is some discussion in the literature.9 6 There
is broad language ranging from Blackstone (a pardon gives a "new
credit and capacity") " to the Supreme Court (a pardon "blots out of
existence the guilt") 98 suggesting a contrary result, although there are
also analogies to support the decision. 9 It is to be observed that the law
is well-settled that a pardon wipes out the incompetency of the convicted
person to testify,' and it may be thought inconsistent to permit the
pardoned conviction to be used as a weapon to attack his honesty.'
To be sure, the pardon does not change or alter the fact of conviction,
93. In 1934 Harry Bridges, an alien, was cleared by the Immigration Service
of subversive activities or connections. In 1936, he was again cleared by the Service.
Subsequently, Dean Landis, acting for the Secretary of Labor, after extended
hearings producing a 7700 page transcript, cleared him a third time. But the clearance would not stick and hearings were again held by Judge Sears on a new warrant. This time the findings were against Bridges, but the Supreme Court reversed
with two blistering opinions. Thus the Government failed to make good charges that
Bridges was or had been a Communist. But in 1949, he was indicted for conspiracy
to defraud the Government-by lying when he swore in his naturalization proceedings that he had never been a Communist. He was convicted, United States v.
Bridges, 90 F. Supp. 973 (N.D Cal. 1950), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 21
U.S.L. WEa 2134 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1952). The petition for certiorari is now pending.
94. 192 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 951) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952) ; 50 Micr.
L. Rxv. 1106 (1952) ; 32 B.U.L. REv. 231 (1952); 25 So. CAIjF. L. REv. 231 (1952);
38 VA. L. Rxv. 235 (1952) ; 40 GEo. L.J. 145 (1951).
95. Ez parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1866); United States v. Klein, 13
Wall. 128 (U.S. 1871); Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
96. Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 177 (1939);
Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HA v. L. Rxv. 647 (1915).
97. 4 Bi. Comm. * 152.
98. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (U.S. 1866).
99. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
100. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892).
101. See 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1106, 1107 (1952).
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but that, as Judge Fahy points out in his dissenting opinion, is not the
question. The issue is whether the fact of conviction may be introduced
after a pardon to attack the credibility of the witness. Judge Fahy
thought that to permit such an attack was inconsistent with the policy
which gives the President the exclusive.power to grant a "full" pardon.
This would appear to be an important issue.
SUPERVISION OF FEDERAL EcONomIc REGULATION

The reorganization of the Seaboard Air Line Railway, employing
the usual basis of adjusting the financial structure and valuation of the
road to an estimate of future earnings as approved by the Supreme
Court, 10 2 wiped out the junior securities. The actual earnings since
the reorganization in 1943 have been double the estimate. On these
facts, the holders of the junior securities sought a reopening of the
proceedings with a view to modifying the plan. The senior security
holders had not yet received more in value than the amount of their
claims, as provided by the plan. The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's refusal to re-examine the plan even though it had not
been fully executed.

03

In his "dissent" to denial of certiorari, Justice Frankfurter attached
an opinion raising serious questions as to the soundness of the principles
and "guesswork" on which railroad reorganizations have been allowed.
However, he offers no alternative basis for dealing with the problem,
no such basis, of course, being called for by the occasion. He is
merely "dissenting" from the Court's refusal to consider the matter.
If, indeed, as some economists appear to think,1" 4 the present level of
national income is here to stay and will probably rise, perhaps some
attention to this problem is indicated. But if we may assume that the
high earnings of the railroads during the war and post war years is as
temporary as high earning periods in the past, the matter of predicting
future earnings is about the same as it ever was and the need for reconsidering the wisdom of experience is less pressing.
By dismissing the appeals in two California cases 105 the Court
turned its back on the growing problem 106 of state regulation of the
102. See Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
103. Bondholders, Inc. v. Powell, 190 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342

U.S. 921 (1952).

104. My colleague Eugene Rostow so testified in connection with the Missouri
Pacific reorganization. See I.C.C. Finance Docket 9918, Nov. 30, Dec. 1, 1951.
105. United Air Lines Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, and
Western Air Lines Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 49 Cal. P.U.C.
494 (1951), appeals dismissed, 342 U.S. 908 (1952), Justices Black and Burton dis-

senting.

106. Since these two cases, California has asserted jurisdiction over the rates
on United Air Lines' run from Los Angeles to Santa Catalina Island. The Civil
Aeronautics Board has intervened in this proceeding, entitled United Air Lines v.
Public Utilities Commission of California (not yet reported).
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aviation industry. Acting upon an informal letter from the Director
of the Civil Aeronautics Board recommending that the air lines increase
the air coach passenger rate on the Los Angeles-San Francisco run
from $9.95 to $11.70, United and Western air lines filed an application
for rate increase with the California Public Utilities Commission.
About a month later, on March 1, 1951, both raised their rates to the
level recommended by the CAB, no action having been taken by the
state agency.
On April 24, 1951, after a hearing, the state Commission approved
the rate increase prospectively, but ordered Western and United to
refund $1.75 where possible to all passengers who had paid the advanced price on that run during the period when the increased rate
was being charged but before its approval by the Commission (March
1 to April 24). The Supreme Court of the State of California denied
without opinion the air lines' petitions for writs of review of the Commission's order. From that denial the air lines appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, where the appeals were dismissed "for the
want of a substantial federal question." Justices Black and Burton expressed the opinion that "probable jurisdiction should be noted."
The issue which presented no "substantial federal question" was:
Are the states as well as the federal government to be permitted to
regulate economic activities of commercial air lines? No one would
deny the importance of the commercial aviation industry to the nation.
Its indispensability to mail transportation and its importance to national
security are alone enough to show that its efficient operation is a matter of national concern. Since there is potential confusion inherent in
state economic regulation of any interstate transportation or communication agency, a case which challenges state authority to regulate
as large and growing an industry as aviation would seem to present
a question both federal and substantial.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 107 is ambiguous as to whether
Congress intended to pre-empt the field of aviation, or whether it intended to leave some room for state regulation of intrastate aviation.108
A decision whether Congress in this Act pre-empted economic regulation is necessary for the continued efficiency and welfare of the air
transportation industry. Should the Court decide in favor of state
regulation, then some indication of the proper line between state and
107. 52 STAT. 977 et seq. (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (Supp.
1952).
108. The Act is clear that Congress intended to pre-empt the field as to safety
devices, but it is not clear as to economic regulation. The statement of policy is
that the Act is intended to control "domestic aviation" not "inter-state aviation."
The significance of this language has not yet been decided. See 17 3. Am L. &
Com. 107 (1950).
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federal regulation is equally necessary to the industry. The first or
both questions might have been considered in this case.
In Tom's Express, Inc. v. Ohio,' two interstate trucking concerns
sought to enjoin the enforcement of an Ohio statute "..requiring all
trucks operating within Ohio, including those operating interstate, to
carry protector flaps on the rear-most wheels "to prevent . .
such
wheels from throwing dirt, water or other materials on the windshields
of following vehicles." A three-judge district court upheld the statute
against plaintiffs' claim that it conflicted with federal law: "The federal
government has not pre-empted the field of motor carrier regulations
in connection with mud guards." "' Plaintiffs appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, claiming that the statute invaded a field of regulation
wholly occupied by the Interstate Commerce Act "..and the regulations
promulgated thereunder by the Interstate Commerce Commission." 3
Two cases were cited by the lower court in support of its
order: Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Georgia" 4 and Kelly v. Washington."5
The Washington statute was one requiring inspection and had nothing
to do with the installation of an accessory of the type required by the
Ohio statute. The Georgia statute required installation of headlights
on locomotives, but the statute did not conflict with any regulation of
the I.C.C. nor did it invade any field of authority conferred on it by
Congress.
In the district court, plaintiffs contended that their trucks were
fully equipped in accordance with the detailed requirements and standards of the Commission, and that no state could require of them different or additional safety equipment. Viewing the problem narrowly,
the lower court was quite correct in concluding that the mudguard
statute did not overlap or conflict with any of the ICC Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations. But when it held that the federal government has
not pre-empted this field of regulation, it was ruling on a question not
previously decided by the Supreme Court. The important problem,
then, was not the conflict with federal authority, but the invasion of it.
109. Tom's Express, Inc. v. Division of State Highway Patrol, 105 F. Supp.
916 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 944 (1952), Justices Reed and Douglas
dissenting.
110. OHIo GEx. CoDE AN. §7250-3 (Ann. Supp. 1951).
111. 105 F. Supp. 916, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1952).
112. 49 STAT. 546 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §304(a) (1) (1946) providing:
"(a) It shall be the duty of the Commission-(l) To regulate common carriers
by motor vehicle . . . and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable
requirements with respect to . . . safety of operation and equipment."

113. Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, pt. 193, ICC Order, 17 F.R. 4430
(1952).
114. 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
115. 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Plaintiffs' brief on appeal stressed the need for uniformity in this
field of safety equipment, arguing that Congress not only had intended
to occupy the entire field but also had rejected the proposition that
the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over safety devices
and appliances was to be shared with the states.
A much needed uniformity of safety equipment requirements
throughout the nation has been provided by the Interstate Commerce
Commission's regulations. If the lower court's decision is correct, it
would seem that the regulations of the Commission are only minimum
standards of equipment, upon which the states may elaborate at will so
long as there is no outright conflict. Whether these regulations were
intended to be minimum standards or whether they pre-empt the field
would seem to be an important question of national policy. This case
clearly presented that issue, but the Supreme Court declined to review.
Two justices, Reed and Douglas, apparently felt that the Congressional
policy behind the Commission's safety equipment regulations was sufficiently "substantial" to warrant examination by the Supreme Court.
By refusing to review an important NLRB case "6 the Court
passed over an opportunity to contribute some needed clarification of
the legal effect of agreements made in settlement of labor disputes.
The employer, Poole Company, had bargained in good faith with the
International Association of Machinists for over two years, when in
May, 1949, the Union filed charges with the NLRB, claiming several
unfair labor practices. The Board investigated the charges, but filed
no complaint. In December, 1949, six months after the Union's
charges, the employer and the Union entered into a Board-approved
settlement of the dispute.
Thereafter, while Poole and the Union were bargaining, but before
an agreement had been reached, 64 of Poole's 66 employees petitioned
the Board to decertify the Union because it no longer represented the
employees. Poole refused to bargain with the Union until it furnished
proof that it actually represented a majority of the employees. The
Board rejected the decertification petition, and issued an order directing
Poole to cease and desist from its refusal to bargain. This order was
upheld by the court of appeals, one judge dissenting.
Both the Board and the court of appeals reasoned as follows: If
Poole and the Union had gone through to a full hearing and a decision
by the Board finding Poole guilty of an unfair labor practice as charged,
Poole would have had a duty to bargain with the Union for a "reasonable time" notwithstanding a decertification petition or a loss of
116. Poole Foundry & Machine Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
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majority by the Union. In the absence of any labor dispute Poole
would have been well within its rights in refusing to bargain after the
Union lost its majority. The question presented here is whether the
duty of Poole after a settlement agreement is the same as after such a
full hearing and decision by the board, or the same as its duty in the
absence of a labor dispute. Apparently this was a novel question, no
authority being cited by either side. Both the Board and the court of
appeals decided that a settlement agreement was to have the same legal
effect as an order by the Board in an unfair practice suit.
Perhaps the court of appeals was correct in its policy argument
that, if the employer could challenge the union's majority status immediately after a settlement agreement, unions would be forced to refuse
settlement and to push all their claims to final determination by the
Board in order to prevent the employer's use of the dispute as a means
of destroying the union. On the other hand, the decision in effect
makes a settlement by the employer an admission of the truth of the
charges against him-a result contrary to the usual view of settlements
and one which may tend to discourage employers from settling..
The evil to be avoided is the employer's abuse of the settlement
procedure by creating dissatisfaction with the union and then refusing
to deal with it because it does not represent a majority; the goal to be
sought is a maximum use of the settlement procedure; the solution is to
remedy the specific evil without sacrificing the benefit. This solution
might be attained more readily by investigating the unfair practices
charges whenever the employer challenges the union's majority status
shortly after a settlement agreement. If the Board should find that
the charges were well-founded and that the employer's actions had in
part caused the union's fall from majority approval, the employer would
have to continue bargaining for a reasonable time. But if the employer's actions had nothing to do with the disfavor of the union, as
appeared to be the case with Poole, he might properly refuse to bargain.
This decision appears to subvert one of the fundamental purposes
of the National Labor JRelations Act, the right of employees to be
represented by bargaining agents of their own choosing. Poole was
forced to bargain with a union which represented only 2 of its 66 employees. Its good faith was conceded; the union was thoroughly
repudiated; and the only issue raised by the parties was the legal effect
17
of the agreement. Here, then, was a clear cut issue on an important 1
aspect of national policy; yet the Court refused review.
117. In recent years, more than one-third of all labor disputes have been disposed of through such settlement agreements. N.L.R.B., TwELF-rH ANNUAL REPORT 86-87 (1947).
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OF OTHER FEDERAL QUESTIONS

(a) The Judicial System. The Court denied certiorari in Mogis
v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp.,"" a case arising out of a 1945
Nebraska statute 119 providing that to be valid, all "rules" of administrative agencies must be filed with the Secretary of State of Nebraska.
The term "rules" was defined as "any rule, regulation, standard or
policy of general application." Plaintiff brought suit in a federal district court to recover an amount by which the rates prescribed by the
Nebraska Railway Commission for hauling gravel exceeded the
amounts paid under contract by defendant to plaintiff for the latter's
trucking services between 1945 and 1949. The defendant maintained
that the rates were invalid because they had not been filed with the
Secretary of State.
In the district court, the plaintiff demonstrated: (1) that for many
years prior to the 1945 act the rates of the Railway Commission had
been effective upon promulgation by the Commission; (2) that immediately following passage of the act the Railway Commission obtained
a ruling from the Attorney General of Nebraska to the effect that its
rates need not be included within the statutory term "rules"; (3) that
in reliance upon the opinion of the Attorney General, the Commission
has never filed its rates with the Secretary of State; and (4) that two
subsequent legislative sessions had failed to amend the act so as to
require the Railway Commission to file its rates.
The district court held, on narrow grounds of statutory interpretation, that "rules" in the statute included the rates of the Railway Commission, and that, therefore, the rates under which plaintiff sued were
invalid for not having been filed pursuant to the statutory requirements.
In reaching its decision the court rejected the opinion of the Attorney
General and ignored the subsequent administrative practice which had
been accepted tacitly by the legislature. The court of appeals, one judge
dissenting, affirmed on the grounds that no clear error appeared in the
decision of the district court.
Here was a federal district court deciding an important question of
state law and policy in direct conflict with the only state authority
available: an opinion of the attorney general plus several years of administrative practice unaltered by legislative amendment. Does this
present a question worthy of review by the Supreme Court?
One of the more vexing problems created by the decision in Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins '2 o is: How does a federal court in a diversity case
118. 189 F.2d 130, (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951).
119. NEB. REv. STAT. c. 84 § 902 (1950).
120. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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know what the state law is? Under existing decisions, federal judges
are to find state law in the decisions of the highest state court 121 and of
lower state courts.

22

Two views of the Erie rule have been developed. One holds that
if there is an applicable state court decision the federal judge is rigidly
compelled to follow it regardless of how poor or deviant the state decision may be.'
If there is no state court decision in point, then under
this view the federal judge has a free hand in applying what law he
chooses. The other view looks to the policy behind Erie and commands
the federal judge to decide the case the way he thinks the highest state
1 24
court would decide it.

Here, the federal court rejected the available state authority and
reached a conclusion almost without question contrary to what the
Nebraska Supreme Court would have decided. 2 5 With so clear an
issue, the Court could have clarified the Erie decision. It could have
adhered to the letter of the Erie "law," that only state judicial rulings
are to apply; it could have affirmed Erie's policy basis and given the
federal judges power to decide and interpret state law and policy; or it
could have expanded the "state authority" concept to make binding on
federal judges such matters as state administrative practice and opinions
of the attorney general.
There are two additional reasons why the Court might have
granted certiorari in this case.
1. Conflict in the circuits. The court of appeals, after indicating
it would be inclined to grant a stay of proceedings, refused to do so
apparently on the grounds that it lacked power to do so in an action for
damages. This is in direct conflict with a decision in the Seventh
Circuit where the proceedings in a damage action were stayed in order
126
to obtain a state court ruling on the important question of law.

2. Decision contrary to state law. In a Nebraska court an opinion
of the Attorney General on the proper construction of a statute plus
an administrative practice based thereon have great influence, especially
when the statute is unaltered at later legislative sessions. The district
121. Ibid.
122. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
123. Ibid. For a discussion of this view and the problem in general, see Clark,
State Law in. Federal Courts, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946) ; Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey
and Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949).
124. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
125. See dissent in Mogis v. Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 189 F.2d
130, 143 (8th Cir. 1951).
126. Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 186 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1951).
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court failed to give these factors the consideration required by Nebraska
law.
It may be that, as between the parties to the action, the result was
a just one. It looked very much as if the plaintiff, as an afterthought,
was seeking a windfall. But it may also be that a denial of certiorari is
not a very good stick to beat a dog with.
Erie Forge Co. v. United States 127 was an action in a district
court by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under section 291 of
the Internal Revenue Code 128 to collect delinquency penalties because of
the taxpayer's late filing of his return. In a previous suit in the Tax
Court, the taxpayer had contested unsuccessfully the Commissioner's
notice of deficiency in tax for the same years. In that suit the Tax
Court had denied the Commissioner's motion to amend his answer
(made six months after the close of the evidence) so as to include the
delinquency penalties, the denial being based on the grounds that the
issue had not been properly raised by the Commissioner.
Before the close of the Tax Court proceedings, the Commissioner
began this action in the district court. The district court found for the
taxpayer on two grounds. (1) The Tax Court's decision was res
judicata of all issues between the taxpayer and Commissioner for the
years in question, and the Commissioner could not now reassert in the
district court a claim which had been rejected in the Tax Court. (2)
A "delinquency penalty" is a "deficiency" within the meaning of section 272(a),"O and therefore cannot be collected from the taxpayer
without going through the procedure provided in section 272 (a), which
procedure the Commissioner had not employed.
Reversing the district court on both grounds, the court of appeals
held that a delinquency penalty was not a "deficiency" and that the
issue of the delinquency penalty in this case had never been within the
Tax Court's jurisdiction and therefore could not be barred by res
judicata. Justices Douglas and Jackson dissented from the denial of
certiorari.
In its petition for certiorari, the taxpayer presented a strong argument in favor of review of this case. First there was the statutory
problem of interpretation of "delinquency penalties" and "deficiency"
as employed in the Internal Revenue Code. More fundamental was the
policy underlying the jurisdiction of the Tax Court-was it meant to
have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters relating to the taxpayer's
return for a given year? Or could the Commissioner, after losing in
127. 93 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Pa. 1950), 191 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 930 (1952), Justices Douglas and Jackson dissenting.
128. 53 STAT. 88 (1942), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 291 (1946).
129. 53 STAT. 82 (1942), as amended, 26 U.S.C. §272 (1946).
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the Tax Court, turn to the district courts to collect delinquency penalties? If the Commissioner may assert delinquency penalties in a district court, as the court of appeals held in this case, certain results follow which are contrary to the general principles of tax administration.
The basic issue of this case-one of importance to the general public
as well as to the administration of the tax law-is whether the Tax
Court is to be a forum affording the taxpayer a partial and incomplete
determination or remedy, or whether it is to be a forum where all rights
and liabilities of the parties with respect to the period or year in question
can be definitively and finally determined. Under this decision, the
Tax Court can render only an incomplete determination, the issue of
liability for delinquency penalties being subject to the jurisdiction of a
district court at the Commissioner's option.
(b) Miscellaneous Federal Questions. Three Justices,13 0 all
previously associated with the Department of Justice, thought MooreMcCormack Lines v. Foltz 3" sufficiently important to warrant review
by the Court. This case involved an action for libel and slander against
a former employer for giving allegedly false and defamatory information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation which cost the plaintiff his
federal job. The suit was defended by the United States. The district
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the
communication was absolutely privileged."3 2 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that such communications to the FBI were protected
only by a qualified privilege which is defeasible on proof of malice.
The decision fits into the usual pattern. Statements from a previous employer to a present or potential employer have long enjoyed a
qualified immunity conditioned on reasonable and honest belief in their
truth. It appears that in no case has a court granted the extraordinary
protection of absolute immunity. But here, the Government itself,
through its top civilian security agency, is the recipient. It is a plausible
argument, especially in these times of acute international tension, that
the utmost protection should be accorded persons interviewed by the
FBI as to the loyalty of present and prospective employees. Such
protection would undeniably tend to encourage persons thus interrogated to tell all. It is not surprising that the Department of Justice
displayed such interest in the case and that two former Attorneys
General and a former Solicitor General, now Justices, should dissent
from the denial of certiorari. On the other side, of course, is the risk
130. Reed, Clark and Jackson.
131. 189 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 871 (1951), Justices Reed,
Clark and Jackson dissenting.
132. Decision not reported.
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that such sweeping protection would tempt malevolent interviewees to
tell more than all. Federal employees would be sitting ducks for unscrupulous and malicious enemies, protected first by anonymity and
second, if discovered, by absolute privilege. In a period when the
similar privilege of members of Congress has been abused so outrageously that serious proposals have been made to curtail it, the
dangers of extending it to everyone outside Congress as well are frightening. The individual rights of the citizen are still entitled to some
consideration even if he is a Government employee.
To meet the threatened Japanese invasion of Alaska in the first
half of 1942, United States military authorities ordered the evacuation
of all natives from the Aleutian Islands. Plaintiff kept extensive flocks
of sheep on the island of Umnak. As part of the general evacuation,
plaintiff's employees were removed from the island, the military remaining in exclusive possession and control in order to operate an air field
and radio station situated there. During the six months period in
which plaintiff was excluded from Umnak, no care of any sort was
given to its flocks. As a result, plaintiff lost some 800 head of sheep
worth approximately $200,000.
Plaintiff's suit in the Court of Claims,' based on the theory it
was entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, was
dismissed on the grounds that the Government did not take possession
of plaintiff's sheep--it only made it impossible for plaintiff to care for
them. "Such losses are an incident to the exercise of the sovereign
power and duty to protect the people from attack by a hostile power.
For losses occasioned by such enterprises the sovereign is immune." 134
As authority for this statement the court cited United States v. Pacific
R.R.5 5 Plaintiff distinguished that case on the grounds that the "taking" there occurred under conditions of actual combat, whereas here, no
actual combat having occurred, plaintiff's loss came from the government's occupying plaintiff's property and requiring plaintiff to vacate.
The principle that no single person should be forced to suffer in order
to benefit the whole nation would seem to require a judgment in plaintiff's favor. However, even if the Court of Claims had decided for the
plaintiff, the case involves a question fully worthy of review by the
Supreme Court.
The underlying problem is the just and equitable allocation of
private losses arising out of modern warfare. In previous wars the
133. Aleutian Livestock Co. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 626 (Ct. C1.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
134. 96 F. Supp. 626, 628 (1951).

135. United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887).

1953]

WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT DO IN 1951

477

geographical scale of operation has been sufficiently restricted to make
useful the rule that compensation shall be denied when property is
destroyed in emergency conditions of actual combat. In modern warfare, however, where potentially any and every spot in the country
could be "in actual combat," this rule becomes meaningless. In case of
an atomic attack on Chicago, it is quite conceivable that "military
necessity" would require the evacuation not only of Chicago and its
suburbs, but also of neighboring cities or even of New York and San
Francisco. The rules and policies which would allocate losses resulting
from the use of private property by the government and from enforced
neglect because of such evacuations are unquestionably matters of
national concern.
We have here, then, a case presenting a problem of widespread
interest, the existing rules for the solution of which are outmoded by
nearly half a century of technological development. Further, in the
present precarious situation of international politics, this problem
threatens to become one of increased and perhaps critical importance.
Yet the Court dismissed the case with the usual unexplained "certiorari denied."

136

Justice Black dissented in Ancich v. Borcich,13 7 an action in admiralty in which seamen sought to recover wages and maintenance from
a negligently operated vessel which collided with their craft. The
owners were also parties, seeking recovery for damages to the ship.
Both prevailed in the district court but the court of appeals reversed
as to the seamen. The Supreme Court denied motions by two labor
to file briefs amici curiae and denied the petition for certiorari.
unions ...
Justice Black, in "noting" his dissent, also "noted" his view that the
decision of the court of appeals should be reversed-uncommon behavior on denial of certiorari.
The crewmen in this case were employed on a fishing vessel under
what, in the trade, is called a "lay plan," which is an agreement whereby
the men get as compensation a share in the proceeds or profits of the
venture. In the instant case, their collective share was to be 68%, that
of the owners 32%o."" The craft was out of operation for repairs for
about two and one-half months as a result of the accident. The trial
136. A petition for rehearing was denied, 342 U.S. 907 (1952), despite petitioner's contention that the Court of Claims had reached an opposite result in Caltex,
Inc. v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 970 (Ct. Cl. 1951), in which recovery was.
allowed for claimant's Philippine property, which was destroyed to prevent its falling
into enemy hands. If recovery was proper there, then it would also seem proper
in the Alaska case.
137. 191 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 905 (1952).
138. Atlantic Fisherman's Union and Fisherman and Allied Workers Division,
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.
139. See 6 MIAmi L.Q. 505 (1952).
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judge found that the crew's share of anticipated profits amounted to
$9,180, which would give them a little over $900 apiece. He found the
owners were entitled to $4,320 in anticipated profits and to $14,678.61
for damages to their boat. The court of appeals let the judgment in
favor of the owners stand. Its denial of recovery to the crew was based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint.140

The Robbins case is a controversial one. There, a time charterer
sought to recover for loss of future profits from the use of the vessel
when a dry dock company, under contract with the owners, negligently
damaged the ship's propeller, thus delaying her return to service. The
Court denied recovery because the defendant had contracted with the
owners, not the charterer, and "a tort to the person or property of one
man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the
injured person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the
doer of the wrong." ' Since the great English case of Lumley v.
Gye,'42 this proposition does not apply to intentional and unjustified
interferences with other persons' contractual relations, even where plaintiff's loss is caused by injury to "person or property." " The present
case could be distinguished from the Robbins case if anyone wanted to
do so. Justice Holmes, in Robbins, seemed to think that the fact that
the dry dock company had no knowledge of the charter party was important. The "lay plan" of employment for men on small fishing craft
off the California coast is so common that it could hardly be said that
damage to such a vessel would not foreseeably cause loss of income to
the crew, either by loss of wages or a share in future catches.'4 There
is a substantial argument that the problem is an important one and that
the decision in the Robbins case is of such dubious soundness that it
ought to be reconsidered.
SILENCE

It is the position taken in this as well as in the two preceding
articles that the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the
manner of its exercise is a major problem which requires some kind of
solution. The position is that these 900 or 1000 annual denials of certiorari and dismissals of appeals have a significance for the administration of justice far out of proportion to the casual comments made
140. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
141. Id. at 309.
142. 2 E. & B. 216 (1853).
143. See United States v. Laflin, 24 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1928) (master was permitted to recover on behalf of the crew for anticipated profits).
144. See 6 MIAmI L.Q. 505, 506 (1952).
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from time to time by a single justice. There is no suggestion here that
the Court is not industrious, that it should necessarily take more cases,
that it is not conscientious. There is a suggestion, however, that it is
laboring under a serious misapprehension of what it is doing and of the
effect of its behavior on the profession. It is the position of these
articles that the Supreme Court is making important decisions of public
law and public policy in its handling of its discretionary jurisdiction.
These decisions always are made behind a baffling and impenetrable
curtain of silence.
These articles have been, for the most part, critical and destructive.
Some feeble efforts have been made to be constructive; some suggestions for improvement have been made. Most, perhaps all, of them
have probably been of no value. But the fact still remains that here is
a major problem. Primarily it is the Court's problem, not the problem
of the writers of these articles. There is some evidence that one of the
justices is concerned about it. There is not much evidence that the
Chief Justice is bothered, even though he has a responsibility for the
operation of his Court somewhat beyond that of his brethren. In any
event, it becomes with each term increasingly clear that the situation
cries aloud for something other than the silence with which it is met.

